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Introduction
From our cell phones to our cars, foreign products permeate American
society. The expanding global economy depends on contracts, which pro-
vide companies with a degree of predictability to hedge against uncertain-
t B.S., Drexel University, 2003; Candidate for J.D., Cornell University Law School,
2007. The author would like to thank the Cornell International Law Journal Editorial
Board for its work on this note and Professor Theodore Eisenberg for his empirical legal
studies seminar, from which this note originated. All misjudgments, errors and
omissions are my own.
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ties in their business transactions. But not all contracts are created equal.
All too often, contracting parties fail adequately to anticipate disputes that
lie dormant during negotiations but wreak havoc during performance.
These disputes frequently arise from the complexities of international com-
mercial transactions, which befuddle even the most seasoned lawyers.
Lawyers can minimize the disruptiveness of these disputes by stipulat-
ing in the contract a method of resolving all potential disputes. Arbitration
and litigation are two such methods; however, choosing between these can
be difficult, particularly when contracts involve parties from different
countries. Even the objective of drafting a dispute resolution clause may
escape the purview of lawyers negotiating international contracts. After
all, negotiations typically focus on key business features of a transaction
rather than "boilerplate" provisions in the contract, such as dispute resolu-
tion clauses.' Failure to consider the ramifications of including an arbitra-
tion or litigation clause may produce serious unintended consequences.
For instance, after a dispute arises, two parties that had consented to liti-
gate disputes in an American court may be surprised to learn that they do
not satisfy the court's jurisdictional requirements, and that to adjudicate
their dispute the parties may need to appear before the court of another
country. Further, even if a claimant prevails in an American court, the
victory may be meaningless if the claimant cannot attach its adversary's
assets. Assets located in another country, however, are generally unreach-
able if courts of that country do not recognize judgments from American
courts.
2
Perhaps stipulating to litigate potential disputes in a foreign court
would solve the dilemma. Yet, understanding the language of foreign
courts and navigating their complex procedural laws are anathema to
many American businesses and their lawyers. Moreover, arbitration,
despite its growing popularity, often fails to extricate the claimant from
this conundrum. Many arbitrators prefer resolutions that do not produce
total victory for either party but rather allocate evenly responsibility for
damages. As a result, the parties may obtain more or less favorable deci-
sions than an American court might render. 3
Given the complications of resolving international commercial dis-
putes, the primary objective of this Note is to answer the following ques-
tion: Are parties to international contracts stipulating arbitration or
litigation clauses in a manner that minimizes the risk of biased or unpre-
dictable decisions? Part I of this Note summarizes the literature analyzing
the advantages and disadvantages of using litigation and arbitration to
resolve commercial disputes. Part II describes the data underlying the
1. Fredric D. Tannenbaum, International Contracts: Practical Considerations to Max-
imize Enforcement, PRAc. LAw., Oct. 1998, at 72.
2. The United States is not party to any treaty recognizing American judgments
abroad.
3. Charles N. Brower & Abby C. Smutny, Arbitration Agreements Versus Forum
Selection Clauses: Legal and Practical Considerations, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 37, 49-50 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1996).
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empirical analysis that follows in Part IIl. These include all ninety-six
merger, acquisition, combination, share and stock exchange, and reorgani-
zation contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
between January 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003 and involving at least one
foreign party. Part III begins by comparing the relative frequency of arbi-
tration and litigation clauses in these contracts. Part III then considers
whether these usage rates are consistent with the analytical framework
established in Part I for how parties should select dispute resolution
clauses. Part III suggests possible explanations for the observed frequency
of arbitration and litigation clauses, and ends by describing the location of
the courts selected by parties that stipulated to litigate potential disputes.
Part IV discusses limitations to the study and presents suggestions for
future research. Part V provides a conclusion.
1. Background
When prudent parties negotiate the terms of a contract, they generally
specify a method to resolve potential contractual disputes. Two types of
clauses are commonly used.4 The first triggers arbitration or litigation
when a dispute arises. If parties stipulate a litigation clause, arbitration
clause, or both, they may also include the second type of clause-a forum
selection clause-setting forth the location and often the court in which
parties will resolve potential disputes.5
A. Dispute Resolution Clauses
The importance of stipulating the method of resolution before a dis-
pute arises is apparent in light of the alternative. 6 In the absence of a dis-
pute resolution clause, the disputing parties confront two unappealing
choices. 7 They may try, on the one hand, to find a mutually acceptable
resolution method, undergoing the very negotiating process avoided ear-
lier. Their strained relationship, however, may significantly diminish the
prospects of a successful compromise. 8 A party may search, on the other
hand, for a court with both subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and
personal jurisdiction over its adversary. 9 For a claimant whose adversary
is from a foreign country, however, this search can be daunting. 1 0 Suppos-
ing that the claimant is able to find a qualified court, he then faces the
4. Mediation, a third method of resolving disputes, is not analyzed in this Note.
5. Tannenbaum, supra note 1, at 76-79.
6. See Brower & Smutny, supra note 3, at 37; see also Bernard E. Le Sage, The Choice
of an International Arbitration Forum: Contracting Parties can Avoid the Uncertainty of
Foreign Courts, Los ANGELES LAWYER, Sep. 1998, at 19 (noting the importance of "cer-
tainty and predictability in international dispute resolution"); ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM
SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSACTIONAL LITIGATION 275-77 (2003).
7. Brower & Smutny, supra note 3, at 37.
8. Id. at 37-38.
9. Id. at 38.
10. See William W. Park, The Relative Reliability of Arbitration Agreements and Court
Selection Clauses, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM
SELECTION 3, 5-6 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997).
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possibility of litigating in a foreign language, under unfamiliar procedural
law, and before a partial judge." Even if the claimant manages to prevail
in a United States' court, no international treaty compels a foreign court to
recognize the American judgment. 1 2 Worse yet, the judgment from an
American court does not guarantee attachment of the assets located in for-
eign countries. 3 Astute parties can avoid many of these complications
simply by stipulating to arbitrate or litigate any potential dispute.
Choosing between litigation and arbitration, however, requires careful
consideration of several factors. For this inquiry, it is helpful to compare
the differences between domestic and international commercial dispute
resolution.
I will begin by discussing dispute resolution between domestic parties.
Many American businesses and lawyers believe that courts resolve disputes
more fairly than arbitrators. 1 4 They also suspect many arbitrators issue
unanimous awards merely to compel the parties to accept the award as
final. 1 5 A party convinced that it has either a strong claim or skilled law-
yers capable of compensating for a weaker case may prefer to litigate in
court. Moreover, unlike litigation, arbitration in the United States is not
governed by formal rules of evidence, precedents, or appellate review,
injecting additional uncertainty. 1 6 Although arbitration is widely touted
for its speed and affordability, these advantages largely depend on the facts
of the transaction.' 7 Finally, a party can specify the dispute resolution
forum in the litigation clause to achieve certain intangible benefits.' 8 A
contract may, for example, contain a clause securing exclusive jurisdiction
in a court that provides the dominant party with a "hometown" advantage
in litigation. 19 This example illustrates that, contrary to popular percep-
tion,20 the drawbacks of arbitration are often unable to overcome the
advantages of litigation for resolving commercial disputes between domes-
tic parties.
Achieving the twin objectives of neutrality and predictability demands
a different approach, however, when the transaction involves parties from
11. Park, supra note 10, at 5-6.
12. RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 775-
76 (8th ed. 2003); WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 46-47 (1995).
13. Park, supra note 12, at 46-47.
14. See Brower & Smutny, supra note 3, at 49-50.
15. See id.
16. Id. at 48-50.
17. Park, supra note 10, at 4; see John Y. Gotanda, An Efficient Method for Determin-
ing Jurisdiction in International Arbitrations, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 12-13
(2001) ("While international arbitration has indeed become the method of choice for
many parties when resolving international disputes, it has experienced growing pains.
Many complain that arbitration is often expensive and rarely results in a quick
decision.").
18. Related to this point, Professor Park discusses the use of forum selection clauses
by the dominant party to a contract as a tool of oppression against the weaker party. See
Park, supra note 10, at 4.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 4 ("Despite the practitioners and scholars who wax eloquent about arbitra-
tion's high speed and low costs .... ").
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different countries. 2 1 In international business transactions, arbitration
confers special advantages that often outweigh its perceived shortcomings.
Indeed, it serves as an effective "tool to minimize the real or imagined dan-
gers of litigation abroad: a mechanism to reduce the risk of ending up
before a biased foreign judge who will apply unfamiliar procedures in a
strange language." 2 2  Alternatively, parties may minimize the risks
involved in litigating before a biased foreign judge by stipulating, along
with a litigation clause, a court selection clause specifying an exclusive list
of courts that may resolve potential disputes between the parties.2 3 The
following two sections discuss both options and explain why arbitration is
preferable to litigation for resolving contractual disputes between parties
from different countries.
B. Using Court Selection Clauses to Resolve Disputes
Parties may consent to litigate in courts of a particular city, state, or
province to improve predictability or assure impartial adjudication of the
dispute. 24 To achieve neutrality, the chosen court may sit in a country
unaffiliated with any of the parties; 25 to achieve predictability, it may be
one with which both parties are familiar.
A careful examination of the legal and practical implications of court
selection clauses, however, reveals their limitations for resolving potential
disputes arising from international business transactions. A court located
in a third country may refuse to hear the case on grounds of forum non
conveniens because the court will often lack a significant connection with
the parties or the dispute. 26 In addition, selecting a court based on
hometown advantage may prove less desirable than at first blush. To Amer-
ican businesses and their lawyers, the intuitive choice is to select a United
States court to resolve disputes involving foreign adversaries. 27 Litigating
in the United States means familiar judges, language, customs, and rules of
procedure.28 However, several obstacles may limit realization of these ben-
efits. First, no other country is compelled to recognize a judgment from an
American court. Because the U.S. is not a party to any treaty guaranteeing
21. Id. at 3 (analogizing forum selection clauses to a cow-quite a good animal on a
field but not welcome when trampling through a vegetable patch).
22. Id. at 4; see also Mark R. Joelson, Litigating International Commercial Disputes, by
Lawrence W. Newman and David Zaslowsky, 30 GWJ. INT'L L. & ECON. 159, 159 (1996)
(book review) ("Unfortunately for many litigants, the local judicial system involved may
be ill equipped to deal effectively with the international aspects of the dispute-a task
requiring a significant degree of sophistication and sensitivity.").
23. Park, supra note 10, at 6-7 (presenting arbitration agreements and jurisdiction
clauses as two alternatives to litigation agreements).
24. Id. at 7.
25. William W. Park, Illusion and Reality in International Forum Selection, 30 TEX.
INT' L.J. 135, 137 (1995).
26. See id. at 137.
27. Park, supra note 10, at 7.
28. Id. at 7-8. FIELD ET AL., supra note 12, at 775-76.
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enforcement of American judgments abroad, 29 a claimant who prevails in
an American court may be unable to attach any of its adversary's overseas
assets.30 Second, court selection clauses are not dispositive in the United
States, with the exception of New York in limited cases.3 1 Although several
Supreme Court cases defer to court selection clauses, courts will only
enforce "reasonable" clauses. 32 Multiple factors inform this reasonable-
ness inquiry - a test that itself varies across judicial circuits.33 Third, fed-
eral courts vary in their rules on whether state or federal law governs the
enforcement of court selection clauses.34 Federal courts that regard these
clauses as matters of substantive contract law apply state law, while other
courts apply federal law. 35 Fourth, subject matter jurisdiction and forum
non conveniens could completely bar a court from hearing a dispute.36
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the dispute of two foreign parties that attempt to assert jurisdiction on
the basis of diversity of citizenship. 37 Forum non conveniens may also pre-
clude disputes when witnesses and documents are located in a distant loca-
tion, or when adjudication threatens to drain public resources. 38
C. Using Arbitration Clauses to Resolve Disputes
A World Bank survey of corporate executives revealed that predictabil-
ity and neutrality were principal concerns of international investors.39
Therefore, in order to avoid unfamiliar judicial procedures, foreign lan-
guages and customs, and the potentially partial courts of their foreign trad-
ing partners, international business managers would be expected to
include arbitration clauses in their contracts.40 Indeed, arbitration clauses
confer at least six distinct advantages that litigation clauses alone cannot
29. See generally Park, supra note 10, at 8-9. Donald C. Dowling,Jr., Forum Shopping
and Other Reflections on Litigation Involving U.S. and European Businesses, 7 PACE INT'L L.
REV. 465, 469 (1995) ("As a practical matter, a U.S. party which gets a judgment in a
U.S. court against a European defendant which does not have sufficient assets in the
U.S. will end up re-litigating in a European court, in order to get the Europeans to
enforce the judgment against the defendants' European assets.").
30. PARK, supra note 12, at 46.
31. Park, supra note 10, at 9.
32. See id. (referring to the following Supreme Court cases: Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore, 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Stewart Organization Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988);
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). Bremen held that forum selection
clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by
the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 407 U.S. at 10.
33. Park, supra note 10, at 9.
34. Id. at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 11.
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2005).
38. Park, supra note 10, at 11.
39. See Le Sage, supra note 6, at 19 (providing the cite, "[s]ee, e.g., a 1994 World
Bank survey of corporate executives that ranked Latin America's judicial system as one
of the most significant constraints to private development in the region. Similarly, the
World Bank in its 1997 annual report noted that corruption in law enforcement and the
judiciary is a key factor holding back development of the former Soviet states.").
40. See id. at 19.
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provide: predictability, neutrality, enforceability, confidentiality, finality,
and expertise. I address each factor in turn.
1. Predictability
Arbitration often produces more predictable outcomes than litigation
for international disputes. 4 1 Unlike courts, which can refuse to hear a dis-
pute even if parties consent to a court selection clause, arbitrators will gen-
erally hear a dispute, provided the parties pay an arbitration fee.4 2
Moreover, a court may transfer a dispute to a country where the courts are
unpredictable or entirely unfamiliar to one of the parties. In this case, an
arbitration clause will provide at least one of the parties with more predict-
able outcomes.
2. Neutrality
Arbitration provides for neutrality and fairness by allowing parties to
have their dispute resolved in a "in a mutually accessible country, chaired
by someone of a nationality different from the parties, with proceedings in
English or some other common language, and according to procedural
rules that give neither side an unfair advantage."4 3 To the contrary, a party
forced to litigate in a court of its adversary's country may encounter a
biased judge and be less familiar with the court's customs and procedural
laws.
4 4
3. Enforceability
A prevailing party in arbitration benefits substantially from the ability
to enforce an award in almost all countries where the losing party has its
assets. Enforceability of arbitration clauses and awards are provided by
three major treaty networks to which the United States is a party: the New
York, Washington, and Panama Conventions. 45 The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, frequently called
the New York Convention, mandates that signatory countries recognize
and enforce written arbitration agreements and arbitration awards.4 6 As of
41. Although Professor Park uses the term "reliable," we focus on predictability
because, for purposes of this Note, a more reliable outcome is generally more predict-
able. See Park, supra note 12 at 53. See Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral
Award: Enforcing the Award Against the Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 867,
869 (1996); see also Tannenbaum, supra note 1, at 76-79 (arguing that both larger and
smaller corporations should select arbitration over litigation in their dispute resolution
clauses for international contracts).
42. Park, supra note 10, at 12.
43. Id. at 6; see also Gotanda, supra note 17, at 12.
44. See GIUDITTA C. Moss, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: PARTY AUTONOMY
AND MANDATORY RULES 149-50 (1999).
45. PARK, supra note 12, at 55.
46. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York Arbitration Convention), (June 10, 1958) 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
Article 11 of the Convention provides in relevant part:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
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January 2006, 137 countries have signed the Convention.4 7 To the con-
trary, judicial decisions do not receive the same uniform recognition.
Although many states recognize the principle of comity of judicial awards,
only the legislatures of the state are empowered to implement this
principle.
48
4. Confidentiality
Compared to judicial adjudication of a dispute, which courts hold
before the public, arbitration provides an important measure of confidenti-
ality, particularly to parties sensitive about public perception or the disclo-
sure of proprietary information. Indeed, for larger corporations, the costs
of damage to its commercial reputation can easily dwarf the costs of an
award to its adversary. 4 9
5. Finality
Most arbitration awards are final and binding, either because the arbi-
tration clause explicitly provides for this, or because the governing rules of
arbitration exclude any appeal from an award. 50 Thus, the total duration
of arbitration proceedings may be shorter than that of judicial proceedings
in which appeals are permitted. 5 1
6. Expertise
Parties can select arbitrators with special expertise in the subject mat-
ter of the dispute. This expertise enables the arbitrators readily to appreci-
ate the subtleties and complexities of the parties' transactions. 5 2 Judges,
more typically, possess a general knowledge of private and commercial
practice and, therefore, may require more time than an arbitrator to under-
stand the technical or commercial nuances and implications of complex
transactions. 53
In sum, litigation is frequently a disfavored method for resolving inter-
national commercial disputes because of its inherent complications and
the numerous advantages of arbitration. Nonetheless, if a contracting
party consents to litigation, it should verify that the chosen court may
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration.
Article Il of the Convention provides in relevant part: "Each Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of
procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon .... "
47. Status of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConven-
tion status.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
48. Moss, supra note 44, at 152.
49. Id. at 150-51.
50. Id. at 151.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 150.
53. See id.
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properly adjudicate any potential dispute, and that it can attach the assets
of the other party.
D. Empirical Study
Given the advantages of arbitration in resolving international commer-
cial disputes, do they appear with greater frequency than litigation clauses?
That question forms the heart of my empirical study. At the outset of this
inquiry, I recognize that American parties entering into international con-
tracts may be reluctant to stipulate arbitration clauses unless they or their
lawyers comprehend the potential disadvantages of litigation and the con-
comitant advantages of arbitration. My empirical examination also focuses
on two corollary questions: When parties select litigation clauses, do they
always specify a court? And, if so, where do these courts sit? This Note, I
believe, yields key insights into how lawyers actually draft international
contracts.
To provide context for understanding the results of the study, I will
note that Professor William W. Park, an expert in international dispute
resolution, has commented that few attorneys drafting international con-
tracts carefully compare the merits of arbitration with court selection.54
For instance, when Park asked a group of lawyers who worked on interna-
tional business transactions why they chose particular courts or arbitration
rules, many of them were unable to explain their decisions.55 Additionally,
another commentator and international contracts scholar has observed
that American lawyers have been slow to adapt their approach from negoti-
ating domestic contracts to international contracts despite the increasing
number of international business transactions. 5 6
II. The Data and Statistical Analysis
This Note involves two datasets. The first consists of all ninety-six
merger, acquisition, stock exchange and share exchange, reorganization,
and combination contracts filed with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) between January 1, 2002 and March 31, 2003 and involving at
least one foreign party. For purposes of this study, a contract involves at
least one foreign party when either the acquiring or acquired party was
incorporated or had a place of business in a country other than the United
States. These contracts were obtained by reading over 1,000 merger, acqui-
sition, reorganization, and exchange contracts filed with the SEC during
the identified fifteen-month interval.
54. Park, supra note 10, at 4.
55. Id. at 5. But cf. Michael F. Hoellering, Managing International Commercial Arbi-
tration: The Institution's Role, 49 Disp. RESOL. J. 12, 12 (1994) ("Within the last 35 years,
arbitration, rather than litigation in national courts, has become the preferred method of
resolving international commercial disputes. To a large extent, this modern day reliance
on the international arbitration process .... ").
56. Tannenbaum, supra note 1, at 72 ("Despite the increasing reliance on world trade
as a reality of American life, many lawyers' approach to negotiating contracts between
parties from different countries has not undergone the same profound change.").
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The second dataset consists of 187 merger, acquisition, stock and
share exchange, reorganization, and combination contracts filed with the
SEC between March 1, 2002 and June 30, 2002. Unlike the first dataset,
the second consists only of domestic contracts. A contract is only domes-
tic when both parties had their place of business and incorporation in the
United States. This dataset will be compared with the first dataset to iden-
tify differences between international and domestic contracts.
A brief discussion of the process used to obtain the data is warranted.
The contracts in both datasets were accessed via the searchable EDGAR-
Plus® Database on LexisNexis. 57 Of the various fields coded for in each
contract, the following are pertinent to the analysis: (i) date of SEC filing;
(ii) name of acquiring firm; (iii) name of acquired firm; (iv) type of trans-
action; (v) acquiring firm's place of business; (vi) acquiring firm's place of
incorporation; (vii) acquired firm's place of business; (viii) acquired firm's
place of incorporation; (ix) law governing the contract; (x) presence of an
arbitration or litigation clause; (xi) consent to jurisdiction of one or more
forums; and (xii) location of forum. The type of transaction involved was
determined by reading each contract and either identifying the contractual
clause that expressly describes the transaction type or analyzing the struc-
ture of the transaction described in the contract.
The selected data was then imported into Stata 9.0, a statistical analy-
sis software package. Stata's "tabulate" command was used to display the
field (e.g., the frequency of litigation clauses) I wished to observe. After
identifying the relevant fields, the Fisher's exact test was used to determine
the statistical significance of certain results. Stata supports the Fisher's
exact test through the "Chi2 exact" command. Another test employed in
this analysis is the test of power, which Stata supports through the
"sampsi" command. The power calculation reveals whether the sample size
is large enough to observe a statistically significant difference in the
results.
III. Analysis
A. Frequency of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses
Given that arbitration is preferable to litigation in resolving interna-
tional commercial disputes, this section presents the observed rates of arbi-
tration and litigation clauses among international and domestic contracts.
Table 1 shows the rates of both types of clauses for international contracts.
57. From LexisNexis, the path to the EDGARPlus database is as follows: "Legal" >
"Area of Law - By Topic" > "Securities" > "Filings" > "SEC Full-Text Filings" > "EDGAR-
Plus@ Database." After arriving at the Database, which features a searchable textbox,
two search terms were entered: exhibit type 2 (EXHIBIT-TYPE (2)) and the filing date of
the contract in the "FILING-DATE IS" field. The number two (2) in exhibit type corre-
sponds to acquisition and reorganization plans. This search produces all merger, acqui-
sition, reorganization, stock and share purchase, stock and share exchange,
combination, and spin-off contracts filed with the SEC on the entered date. As an exam-
ple, the search term for contracts filed on February 1, 2002 would be: EXHIBIT-TYPE
(2) and FILING-DATE IS (2/1/2002).
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It indicates that of the ninety-six contracts, only 15% contain an arbitra-
tion clause, while 67% contain a litigation clause, signifying that there are
over four times as many litigation clauses as arbitration clauses.
The remarkably low percentage of arbitration clauses is startling.58
One might suspect, consistent with the commentaries of Professor Park
and legal scholars, that the parties to the contracts did not fully consider
the different implications of domestic and international dispute resolution.
If this were true, one would expect to observe similar rates of arbitration
and litigation clauses. On the other hand, the parties may have fully recog-
nized the precarious nature of litigating international commercial disputes
but continued to perceive arbitration as too troublesome. Unfortunately,
only a modicum of relevant literature exists on the perceptions and behav-
iors of lawyers negotiating contracts.
5 9
To better understand the different manner in which the parties and
their lawyers drafted domestic and international contracts, I compared the
rates of arbitration and litigation clauses between the two types of con-
tracts. Table 2 shows these rates for domestic contracts. A comparison of
Table 2 and Table 1 reveals a similar frequency of arbitration clauses in
domestic and international contracts. 21.9% of domestic contracts and
14.6% of international contracts contain arbitration clauses. Likewise,
57.8% of domestic contracts and 66.7% of international contracts contain
litigation clauses. Although the frequency of arbitration clauses is slightly
higher in domestic than in international contracts, the difference, p =
0.156, is not statistically significant.60 The statistical insignificance means
58. See the discussion below on the test of powers for what might have been a mean-
ingful difference between the frequency of arbitration clauses in international and
domestic contracts.
59. See generally Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 116-17 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000) (discussing the "effects that the status quo bias can have on the negotiation of
contract terms").
60. One can view the test of statistical significance as analyzing the hypothesis that
international and domestic contracts are equally like to contain arbitration clauses.
This hypothesis is called the null hypothesis. The reported significance levels, also
called p-values, represent the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in
fact true. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1127 n.17 (1996) (citing GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G.
COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 64 (8th ed. 1989)) ("The p-value measures the likelihood
that the observed differences in win rates are attributable to mere random variation
rather than real differences. If the p-value is 0.05, for example, there is a 5% probability
that the observed or larger differences could occur by chance if in fact the null hypothe-
sis were true. Convention dictates that p-values at or below the 0.05 level are described
as statistically significant."); THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE
IN THE COURTS 197 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
The following table was used to determine the statistical significance of the frequency
of arbitration clauses. The table categorizes contracts based solely on the presence of an
arbitration clause.
Arbitration Clause
(Number of clauses in parentheses)
Yes No
International 14.6% (14) 85.4% (82)
Domestic 21.9% (41) 78.1% (146)
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that the hypothesis that arbitration clauses appear with similar frequency
in domestic and international contracts is not necessarily false. As a prac-
tical matter, this is equivalent to concluding that no difference exists
between the rates of arbitration clauses in domestic and international con-
tracts. Thus, the frequency of litigation clauses betrays the significant risk
of unpredictable or biased outcomes associated with this method of dis-
pute resolution.
Table 1. Frequency of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses:
International Contracts
Arbitration Clause Litigation Clause
Yes 14 (14.6%) 64 (66.7%)
No 82 (85.4%) 32 (33.3%)
Total 96 (100.0%) 96 (100.0%)
Note: This data consists only of contracts filed fromJanuary of 2002 through March of 2003.
Table 2. Frequency of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses: Domestic
Contracts
Arbitration Clause Litigation Clause
Yes 41 (21.93%) 108 (57.8%)
No 146 (78.07%) 79 (42.2%)
Total 187 (100.0%) 187 (100.0%)
Note: This data consists only of contracts filed from March through June of 2002.
Table 3. Frequency of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses:
International and Domestic Contracts
Arbitration Litigation
only only Both types None Total
International 5 55 9 27 96
(5.21%) (57.29%) (9.38%) (28.13%) (100.0%)
Domestic 16 83 25 63 187
(8.56%) (44.39%) (13.37%) (33.69%) (100.0%)
Total 21 138 34 90 283
(7.42%) (48.76%) (12.01%) (31.80%) (100.0%)
Note: P = 0.225 (Fisher's exact)
The power value of a statistical test should be indicated when claiming
A two-sided Fisher's exact test shows a p-value of 0.156, meaning that there is a 15.6%
probability that the difference between the rates of arbitration clauses in international
and domestic contracts occurred by chance. The Fisher's exact test is preferable when
the cell counts are small. Id. Because the computed p-value is significantly larger than
the selected significance level of 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. When the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, the outcome of the experiment is not statistically
significant because one cannot rule out mere chance as an explanation of the difference.
Note that no amount of data will permit us to accept the null hypothesis as true.
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that no statistically significant effect is discernible. 6 1 The power test deter-
mines whether the sample size of a study is large enough to reveal socially
meaningful differences in the results.6 2 In this study, the power value rep-
resents the likelihood of detecting a specified change in the frequency of
arbitration clauses when comparing domestic and international contracts
at the 0.05 significance level. 63 Unless a test is powerful, the likelihood of
detecting the effect is small.
6 4
Calculating a power value requires specifying a value representing a
socially meaningful change in the frequency of arbitration clauses from
domestic to international contracts. Before specifying this value, note that
the observed change, a decrease of 7.1%-from 21.9% (domestic contracts)
to 14.6% (international contracts) -is not socially meaningful. Indeed, it is
contrary to expectation because international contracts should have con-
tained more, not fewer, arbitration clauses. Therefore, I dismiss the useful-
ness of calculating the power value of the observed change and instead
calculate the power value of two changes that one would consider meaning-
ful. Suppose I specified an increase in the frequency of arbitration clauses
from 21.9% (domestic contracts) to 32.9% (international contracts). The
power of our test would be 0.46. In other words, the sample size yields a
46% chance of detecting an increase from 21.9% to 32.9%. Alternatively,
suppose I specified a change from 21.9% to 43.8%. The power of the test
would be 0.95 and therefore, I have a high chance of detecting this differ-
ence if it exists.
The preceding analysis compares data collected from fifteen months of
international contracts (January 2002 through March 2003) with four
months of domestic contracts (March through June of 2002). One can
address this discrepancy in the dates of the contracts by including in the
dataset domestic contracts filed during the same fifteen months as the
international contracts. Numerous practical constraints, however, made
gathering a sufficient amount of data for this comparison prohibitively dif-
ficult. I was able, however, to determine the frequency of arbitration
clauses for international contracts filed during the same four-month period
as the domestic contracts. The data reveal no significant difference from
the frequency of arbitration clauses for the fifteen-month period; therefore,
the results of the study are not suspect. Among the twenty-one interna-
tional contracts filed during these four months, only three (14.3%) had
arbitration clauses. This percentile figure, although based on a relatively
sparse dataset, corresponds with the 14.6% frequency of arbitration clause
for international contracts filed during the entire fifteen month period.
Similarly, there does not appear to be any reason (e.g., temporary fluctua-
61. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages
Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact of the BMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards,
and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will be Reduced, 7 S. CT. EcoN. REv. 59, 80
(1999).
62. See id.
63. See id. at 79-80 ("The power of a statistical test is the likelihood of detecting an
effect of a specified size at a specified significance level.").
64. Id. at 80.
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tions in market conditions) to infer that the 21.9% of arbitration clause for
domestic contracts would fluctuate significantly if the dataset were
extended from four to fifteen months.
B. Factors Influencing Frequency of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses
The following section attempts to identify factors that may have influ-
enced the relative reliance on arbitration and litigation clauses. To identify
these factors, the section examines a possible correlation between the use
of arbitration clauses and the presence of particular factor.
1. Reliance on Litigation
Parties may perceive marginal benefits from adding an arbitration
clause to a contract already containing a litigation clause. Thus, the perti-
nent question is whether parties have stipulated litigation clauses in place
of arbitration clauses. Table 3 shows the number of international contracts
that contain only an arbitration clause, only a litigation clause, both types
of clauses, or neither type of clause. It indicates that of the eighty-two
international contracts without an arbitration clause, twenty-seven (33%)
contain no litigation clause.65 This indicates that in nearly one-third of the
contracts without an arbitration clause this omission did not result from
any reliance on a litigation clause. Conversely, 67% of the international
contracts without an arbitration clause contained a litigation clause. We
cannot conclude, of course, that the inclusion of a litigation clause caused
the exclusion of an arbitration clause.6 6 That is, we cannot decisively say
that these parties adopted litigation clauses in lieu of arbitration clauses.
Determining whether parties relied on litigation clauses provides us
with another opportunity to compare the frequency of dispute resolution
clauses in international and domestic contracts. Table 3 shows that,
among the 146 contracts without an arbitration clause, sixty-three (43%)
contain no litigation clause. 67 This percentage is similar to the corre-
sponding figure of 33% for international contracts. 68
2. Type of Transaction
Because the datasets include contracts representing different types of
transactions (e.g., mergers, acquisitions, combinations, exchanges, and
reorganizations), it is possible that a disproportionately large percentage of
the dispute resolution clauses appeared in only certain types of transac-
65. The eighty-two international contracts consist of the fifty-five contracts with
only a litigation clause and the twenty-seven contracts without a dispute resolution
clause.
66. We can observe only correlation, but not causation, between these two factors.
67. The 151 international contracts consist of eighty-eight contracts with only a liti-
gation clause and sixty-three contracts without a dispute resolution clause. The twenty-
eight percent refers to the twenty-seven international contracts without a dispute resolu-
tion clause.
68. Thirty-three percent equals the twenty-seven international contracts without a
dispute resolution clause, divided by the eighty-two international contracts without an
arbitration clause, and multiplied by 100.
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tions. For example, merger agreements could be particularly conducive to
arbitration clauses. If this were true, the number of arbitration clauses
would be limited largely by the number of merger contracts in the dataset.
Table 4 allows us to identify any correlation between type of transaction
and the frequency of arbitration or litigation clauses and thereby detect
potentially limiting factors. A comparison of the frequency with which a
particular type of transaction appears in the dataset and the frequency
with which arbitration or litigation clauses appears for that type of transac-
tion will reveal any such correlation. If the latter is substantially greater
than the former, a limiting effect might exist. For example, suppose 30% of
the international contracts are mergers, but merger contracts contain 90%
of all arbitration clauses. It follows that the presence of merger contracts
tends to limit the total number of arbitration clauses. If the dataset had
fewer merger contracts, it is likely that the number of arbitration clauses
would decrease correspondingly.
Table 4 shows the distribution of arbitration and litigation clauses
among the five categories of transactions. With few exceptions, Table 4
reveals similarities between the percentages of arbitration or litigation
clauses belonging to a particular type of transaction and the percentage of
that type of transaction among the international contracts. For example,
acquisition contracts account for 19.8% of all contracts in the dataset, and
they contain 18.3% of all arbitration clauses and 21.9% of all litigation
clauses. The differences between 18.3% and 19.8%, or 18.3% and 21.9%,
are not sufficiently large to conclude that acquisition contracts contain a
disproportionately large share of the arbitration or litigation clauses within
the dataset. An analogous conclusion holds true for the four other types of
transactions. 6 9 Thus, among contracts comprising the dataset, the scarcity
of arbitration clauses is unlikely to result from the characteristics of any
particular type of transaction.
69. Because of the exceptionally low observance rate of combination contracts (2),
one cannot draw any meaningful conclusions from the percentile figures corresponding
to these contracts.
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Table 4. Distribution of Arbitration and Litigation Clauses among
Types of Transactions in International Contracts
Type of Transaction
(number of clauses in parenthesis)
Arbitration
clause Acquisition Combination Exchange Merger Reorganization Total
No 18.3% 1.2% (1) 19.5% 50.0% 11.0% (9) 100%
(15) (16) (41) (82)
Yes 28.6%(4) 7.1%(1) 0.0%/o(0) 57.1% 7.1%(1) 100%
(8) (14)
Litigation
clause
No 15.6% (5) 3.1% (1) 18.8% 37.5% 25.0% (8) 100.0%
(6) (12) (32)
Yes 21.9% (14) 1.6% (1) 15.6% 57.8% 3.1% (2) 100.0%
(10) (37) (64)
16.7% 51.0% 100.0%
Total 19.8% (19) 2.1% (2) (16) (49) 10.4% (10) (96)
Note: The easiest way to read this table is to compare the italicized percentages in a column.
3. Status of Foreign Party
The presence of a foreign party, either as the acquiring or acquired
company, could influence the decision of American parties in selecting a
particular type of dispute resolution clause. For the purposes of this study,
a contract contains a foreign party if either the acquiring or acquired com-
pany was incorporated or had a place of business in a country outside of
the United States. If contracts involving foreign acquiring parties contain a
disproportionately large percentage of all the arbitration or litigation
clauses, one might conclude that these clauses are correlated with the pres-
ence of foreign acquiring parties. The same analysis holds true for
acquired parties. Table 5 shows that arbitration or litigation clauses are
not disproportionately associated with either foreign acquiring or acquired
parties. Among contracts containing an arbitration clause, 50% had a for-
eign acquiring party while 43% had a foreign acquired party.70 Similarly,
among contracts with a litigation clause, 48% had a foreign acquiring party
while 34% had a foreign acquired party. Because it appears from these
figures that we are only slightly more likely to-find an arbitration or litiga-
tion clause in a contract with a foreign acquiring party than a foreign
acquired party, we cannot confidently conclude that arbitration and litiga-
tion clauses are significantly more associated with one than the other. 7 1
70. Although only 7.1% of contracts with two foreign parties had arbitration
clauses, only 14.6% of all contracts had two foreign parties. More importantly, 7.1%
represents only one (1) party, an exceedingly low number upon which to base any rea-
sonable conclusions for this study.
71. Indeed, the Fisher's exact test yields a p-value of 0.580.
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Table 5. Influence of Foreign Party on Frequency of Arbitration and
Litigation Clauses
Status of Foreign Party
Arbitration Acquiring Acquired Both parties
party party foreign Total
No 34 (41.5%) 35 (42.7%) 13 (15.9%) 82 (100.0%)
Yes 7 (50.0%) 6 (42.9%) 1 (7.1%) 14 (100.0%)
Litigation
No 10 (31.3%) 19 (59.4%) 3 (9.4%) 32 (100.0%)
Yes 31(48.4%) 22 (34.4%) 11 (17.2%) 64 (100.0%)
Total 41(42.7%) 41(42.7%) 14 (14.6%) 96 (100%)
Note: p = 0.580 (Fisher's exact).
C. Court Selection Clauses
This section presents the jurisdictions in which the parties consented
to litigation, and how frequently the parties chose to litigate in the state
whose law governed the contract. This section avoids discussing influ-
ences on the choice of jurisdiction, because the dataset is not large enough
to reveal statistically significant correlations. Nonetheless, Part IV suggests
possible areas of future research if a larger dataset becomes available.
1. Frequency of Court Selection Clauses
A contract that contains a litigation clause may not always contain a
clause stipulating to the jurisdiction of a court. Among the ninety-six con-
tracts studied, however, every litigation clause was accompanied by a court
selection clause. This result is not surprising, since a principal purpose of
including a litigation clause is to influence the outcome of dispute resolu-
tion. As discussed in Part I, often the resolution of a dispute will depend
more on who decides it than on the applicable legal standards. 7 2 Thus,
parties often have every incentive to stipulate the particular court that will
resolve potential disputes.
2. Litigation Jurisdiction
The next inquiry is the frequency with which parties consent to courts
of a particular jurisdiction. Table 6 shows the frequency with which par-
ties selected each litigation jurisdiction. The rows, "Any federal court,"
through, "Washington," represent contracts that explicitly consent to
courts in the United States. The next rows indicate that the only foreign
courts to which parties consented were in Canada, China, England, and
Israel. The final row indicates that thirty-two of the contracts contain no
litigation clause.
The most popular courts were in Delaware and New York. This is not
surprising, because many of the courts in these states are widely regarded
72. Park, supra note 12, at 33; see also Park, supra note 25, at 137 ("The text of a legal
rule is often less important than the context of its interpretation and application.").
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as experienced in resolving complex questions of commercial law. For
instance, the Delaware Chancery court oversees matters involving Dela-
ware's General Corporate Law and has judges appointed by merit. These
courts are also popular because, as the next section reveals, many of the
contracts are governed by Delaware or New York law.
Table 6. Frequency of Court Selection Clauses
Litigation
Jurisdiction Frequency Percentage
Any federal court 4 4.2
California 5 5.2
Colorado 1 1.0
Delaware 17 17.7
Florida 4 4.2
Georgia 1 1.0
Maryland 1 1.0
New Jersey 1 1.0
Nevada 5 5.2
New York 14 14.6
Texas 2 2.1
Washington 2 2.1
Canada 3 3.1
China 1 1.1
England 2 2.1
Israel 1 1.0
None selected 32 33.3
Total 96 100.0
3. Overlap between Litigation Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Ninety-five of the ninety-six contracts stipulate the law that governs
the interpretation of the contract. The selected litigation forum may, but
need not, be in the same state whose law governs the contract. Where the
former and latter do correspond the outcome of litigation is more predict-
able because precedent informs parties of the current interpretation of the
law.73 The outcome of litigation is also more reliable because judges are
more likely to have experience adjudicating the law governing the dispute.
Table 7 shows that among the ninety-five contracts, many of the par-
ties that consented to courts of a state also chose the law of that state to
govern their contract. 74 Specifically, the ratio of (i) contracts containing
consents to both the law and court of state X to (ii) all contracts containing
consents to the court of state X are as follows: 2 to 5 for California (40%),
15 to 17 for Delaware (88%), 3 to 4 for Florida (75%), 5 to 5 for Nevada
73. See David S. Steuer, A Litigator's Perspective on the Drafting of Commercial Con-
tracts, Practising Law Institute: Drafting Corporate Agreements 2004-2005 (2005).
Steuer recommends that parties, where practical, select forums in order to align the con-
tract's choice of forum with its choice of law.
74. California is the one exception. Three of the five contracts consenting to juris-
diction in California also consented to Delaware choice of law.
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(100%), and 12 to 14 for New York (86%). This yields an aggregate aver-
age of 78% among the five states. 75 Among contracts explicitly consenting
to courts of a foreign country,76 every contract was governed by the law of
that country. It is important to note, however, that the low sample rate for
these contracts (three for Canada, two for England, and one for Israel and
the People's Republic of China) limits the usefulness of these observations.
Undoubtedly, a larger sample size would have allowed a fuller exploration
of the implications of the overlap between the country of the selected court
and choice of law. Nonetheless, one expects that a larger dataset would
reveal a strong overlap because, on average, the outcome of dispute resolu-
tion is more reliable and predictable when judges adjudicate disputes
based on laws with which they are very familiar. Finally, I observe that no
party consenting to a foreign court chose American law to govern their
contract. Surely, one reason is to avoid the precarious situation in which
foreign judges apply American laws without the assistance of an expert
counsel.77
Table 7. Frequencies of Choice of Law and Court Selection Clauses
Lim
CA
DE
FL
NV
NY
Other states
Jurisdiction
Other CND
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
z 0
ENG ISR PRC None Any
Virgin Isle 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0
England 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
P.R. of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
China
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
None 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
selected
Total 5 17 4 5 14 8 3 2 1 1 32 4
Note: The abbreviations used for foreign countries are as follows: Canada (CND), ENG (England), Israel
(ISR), and the People's Republic of China (PRC). "None" refers to contracts without a choice of law or
jurisdiction clause. "Any" refers to contracts explicitly consenting to any court in the United States.
"Other" refers to contracts explicitly consenting to states other than CA, DE, FL, NV, or NY.
IV. Limitations and Future Research
The small sample size of the dataset limits the confidence one can
repose in certain conclusions drawn in prior sections of the discussion.
Among the over 1,000 merger, acquisition, reorganization, exchange, and
75. Table 7 consolidates into the "Other" column the data for all states other than
California, Delaware, Florida, Nevada, and New York, because none of the consolidated
states were selected as the location for litigation in more than two contracts.
76. Foreign country means country other than the United States.
77. For the same reason that expert counsel assist American judges applying foreign
law in order to avoid erroneous outcomes, foreign judges may be no better at applying
American law without assistance of expert counsel. See Joelson, supra note 22, at 173.
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combination contracts comprising the dataset, the number of contracts
involving foreign parties is fewer than 10%. Of these ninety-six contracts,
only fourteen contain arbitration clauses. The limitations of the data are
most problematic when attempting to analyze contracts explicitly con-
senting to courts of foreign countries. Considering that fifteen months of
data provided less than three contracts for any foreign country whose
courts were chosen as the litigation forum, 78 several years of data would be
required to draw any statistically significant conclusions about the fre-
quency with which parties consent to courts in foreign countries. Intangi-
ble factors defying strict classification present a final barrier to identifying
influences on the frequency of arbitration and litigation clauses. For
example, the experiences of a party or its lawyers with a particular court
may influence the decision to adjudicate in that court. This type of data,
however, cannot readily be collected.
Given the respective advantages and disadvantages of using arbitration
and litigation to resove international commerical disputes, the low fre-
quency of arbitration clauses is certainly surprising. The observations of
this Note, however, are not entirely surprising considering the fundamen-
tally different objectives for including arbitration or litigation clauses in
domestic and international contracts. Lawyers accustomed to drafting
domestic contracts may not immediately perceive the benefits of arbitra-
tion for resolving international commercial disputes. This could explain
the similarity in the rates of arbitration clauses among the ninety-six inter-
national contracts and the 187 domestic contracts. On the other hand,
lawyers might recognize the different, and often serious, implications of
including or excluding arbitration and litigation clauses in international
contracts but perceive the drawbacks of arbitration as too troublesome.
Although this Note has attempted to account for three factors that might
have influenced the presence of arbitration clauses, others undoubtedly
remain. Given the growth of the global economy, further empirical analy-
sis might prompt more lawyers to place greater emphasis on drafting con-
tracts that mitigate the possibility of obtaining unpredictable and biased
outcomes from international dispute resolution.
The selection of one or more courts to litigate potential disputes also
merits further investigation. In particular, a larger dataset would permit
more accurate characterization of the factors that influence parties and
their lawyers in their selection of courts. Possible factors include choice of
law, the acquiring company's place of business and incorporation, the
acquired company's place of business and incorporation, the drafting law-
yer's place of business, and the reputation of a court.
Due consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration
and litigation reveal that, in general, arbitration is the optimal method of
resolving disputes arising from international contracts. As a group, how-
ever, the parties to the ninety-six contracts from January 1, 2002 through
March 31, 2003 did not rely heavily on arbitration clauses. Indeed, the
78. See Table 7.
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frequency of arbitration clauses was not higher in these international con-
tracts than in the 187 domestic contracts. In considering the manner in
which parties stipulated court selection clauses, this Note observed that
the chosen state or country in a choice of law clause often corresponds to
the chosen state or country in a court selection clause. However, the pau-
city of data makes it difficult to identify factors influencing this selection.
Nonetheless, the results of this preliminary research strongly indicate the
need for further empirical investigation, especially given the importance of
contracts in our increasingly global economy.

